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The Governing Council of the ECB currently has 18 members – six Executive Board members and 
12 national central bank governors, one for each of 
the 12 euro area countries. Formally, all members 
have equal weight in the decision-making process. 
Eighteen members may already be too many from 
the point of view of effective discussion, deliberation 
and decision-making. Enlarging an unreformed ECB 
to include up to perhaps 15 additional national central 
bank governors would turn the Governing Council into 
an unwieldy and perhaps unmanageable group of 33 
members. The Central Bank’s tradition of consensus-
based policy-making – said to play an important role 
in today’s ECB decision-making process, too – could 
further amplify the ECB’s “number problem” and in-
crease decision-making costs. Baldwin et al.1 argue 
that, as a practical matter, the Executive Board initi-
ates many Council decisions, but that its leadership 
ability will be seriously reduced as the number of euro 
area member countries increases and its relative pow-
er decreases. Furthermore, an increase in euro area 
member states without reform would widen the wedge 
between the economic and political weights of EMU 
member countries within the ECB. Since almost all ac-
cession countries are small in economic terms relative 
to current euro area members, enlargement within the 
given institutional set-up would signifi cantly increase 
the degree of over-representation of the area’s smaller 
member countries in the Council in terms of relative 
economic size. For instance, in a monetary union with 
27 members the current ECB statute implies that the 
representatives of its smallest 17 member states, 
representing only about 10 per cent of the area’s ag-
gregated GDP, could determine monetary policy deci-
sions in the euro area.2 Without a reform of the ECB, 
nearly 80 per cent of the countries will have a larger 
political than economic weight. If the “one person, one 
vote” principle were strictly applied, all newcomers 
except the UK would be allocated a political weight 
surpassing their economic weight, in most cases by a 
substantive margin.3
Over-representation could introduce an unwel-
come bias into the ECB’s decision-making, if country 
representatives put at least some weight on national 
economic developments and these developments 
deviate signifi cantly from the behaviour of euro-area 
aggregates. There is reason to believe that such asym-
metries could have an impact on ECB policy-making. 
We shall therefore evaluate various ECB reform op-
tions from three perspectives: decision-making costs, 
the gap between economic and political weights, and 
political feasibility. First, we discuss various reform op-
tions. Second, we zoom in on the reform proposal put 
forward by the ECB. Third, we shall discuss the follow-
ing three remaining questions.
• What is the assessment of the current distribution of 
responsibilities within the ECB Board and its internal 
political equilibrium?
• Will (or, perhaps, should) there be a major redistribu-
tion of portfolios once Mr. Issing is gone?
• What is the general view on the way these hearings 
are conducted, and the fact that Parliament lacks a 
real say in the nominations contrary to what happens 
in the USA?
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Finally, we draw some conclusions. 
Options for Reform of the ECB4 
There are various ways in which the ECB can be 
reformed,5 such as centralisation (the Executive 
Board will become responsible for policy decisions), 
vote-weighting (the vote of a national central banker 
depends on the size of the economy), representation 
(one central banker represents various central banks), 
extending regional central banks across national bor-
ders, and rotation (the governors of national central 
banks have rotating voting rights). Baldwin et al.6 ar-
gue for more centralisation. A pragmatic application 
of the centralisation scenario would be to put actual 
policy decisions into the hands of the ECB Executive 
Board. This would limit the role of the Council to that 
of an informational forum in which the area’s regional 
central banks would be informed of policy decisions 
and implementation issues would be discussed. A 
larger role for the Executive Board in ECB decision-
making would go a long way towards limiting deci-
sion-making costs and preventing possibly diverging 
economic developments within a larger euro area hav-
ing an undue impact on monetary policy in the euro 
area. Article 112 (2) (b) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community specifi es that the Board is ap-
pointed by “... the governments of the member states 
at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a rec-
ommendation from the Council, after it has consulted 
the European Parliament and the Governing Council of 
the ECB”. This highly centralised political process at 
the European level should support a euro-area-wide 
perspective of the nominees selected for the Board. 
However, the political feasibility of centralisation 
seems limited. The principle “one person, one vote” 
is an important feature of the current ECB framework, 
also in day-to-day monetary policy-making. Article 10 
(2) of the ECB Statute clearly states that, “Each mem-
ber of the Governing Council shall have one vote”, 
which includes the national central bank governors. 
Thus, a reform of the ECB that fails to safeguard the 
established voting rights of current member countries’ 
central banks might not be politically acceptable. After 
all, an equal right to participate in ECB policy decision-
making was an integral part of the Maastricht treaty 
that established the currency union. Some member 
governments could experience opposition to letting 
go the “last” bit of infl uence on ECB policy-making af-
ter having exchanged monetary sovereignty for a seat 
on the ECB Council in 1999. 
A somewhat different proposal for centralisation 
that meets some of these objections has been put 
forward by Gros,7 who argues in favour of re-defi ning 
the division of labour between the Executive Board 
and the Governing Council. The tasks of the Govern-
ing Council should be to set the direction for monetary 
policy, decide on proposals from the Executive Board, 
constitute a platform for the exchange of views on 
the euro area economy and monitor the work of the 
Executive Board. These tasks can be performed effi -
ciently even by a rather large body and the representa-
tion of all member countries in the Governing Council 
provides the appropriate legitimacy for such a control-
ling function. According to Gros, the primacy of the 
Governing Council is not affected in this proposal – all 
powers would continue to emanate from it. It does, 
however, reduce the right of the Governing Council to 
control every single act of the Executive Board. Thus 
the Executive Board could come to enjoy a certain de-
gree of discretion, which is justifi ed by the fact that it 
represents not just the aggregation of individual state 
interests but rather a “general European monetary 
interest”. According to Gros, this division of labour is 
based on one key difference between NCB presidents 
and members of the Board that is objective: their re-
spective information bases. Board members concen-
trate on area-wide aggregates in their daily work and 
are likely to be in closer contact with global fi nancial 
markets than the NCB presidents. The latter perform 
a wide variety of functions at the national level: they 
supervise the national banking system, they are infl u-
ential participants in national debates about almost all 
economic policy issues etc. By contrast the members 
of the Board can concentrate almost exclusively on 
issues related to the formulation of the common mon-
etary policy stance. Even though we are quite sympa-
thetic towards this reform proposal, we doubt whether 
it will suffi ciently address the implied risks of the gap 
between political and economic weight. After all, in the 
proposal by Gros,8 all national central bank governors 
4 This section is heavily based on Chapter 7 of: J. De H a a n , S. C. W. 
E i j f f i n g e r, S. Wa l l e r : The European Central Bank: Centralization, 
Transparency and Credibility, Cambridge Mass. 2005, MIT Press. For 
further discussion see also the Briefi ng Papers of February 2003 by 
the members of the Monetary Experts Panel, for example P. B o f i n -
g e r  and D. G ro s , for the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs of the European Parliament.
5 Cf. H. B e rg e r, op. cit.
6 R. B a l d w i n , E. B e rg l o f , F. G i a v a z z i , M. W i d g re n , op. cit.
7 D. G ro s : Reforming the Composition of the ECB Governing Council 
in View of Enlargement: How Not to Do It!, Briefi ng Paper for the Com-






keep one vote in the Governing Council and the Coun-
cil still decides on the direction of monetary policy. 
In the scheme as proposed by Bofi nger,9 who also 
favours a set-up in which the Executive Board takes 
decisions on interest rates, the Governing Council 
even has some kind of veto power over interest-rate 
decisions. This would bring us basically back to the 
current situation. Furthermore, it seems that the politi-
cal feasibility of a reform in which the Executive Board 
would have more power is limited. 
Berger et al.10 argue in favour of a reform such that 
economic size and political power are matched as 
closely as possible. When countries have as much 
voting power as GDP share, possible deviations 
from a purely “European” perspective on the part of 
Council members would not have an undue infl uence 
on monetary policy in the euro area. There are basi-
cally four options here: vote-weighting, representa-
tion, extending regional central banks across national 
borders, and rotation. Under vote-weighting, the votes 
of non-Board members of the ECB Council would be 
weighted when cast for monetary policy decisions, for 
instance by using member countries’ share in euro 
area GDP. By defi nition, a reform along these lines 
would better align the political and economic weights 
of the national Council members. Vote-weighting has 
a precedence in the qualifi ed voting schemes of the 
EU Council, which the Treaty of Nice has updated for 
the case of EU enlargement. Another voting scheme 
that takes into account differences in economic size is 
the idea of a required “double majority” of votes and 
population. Under such a system, there is still an equal 
voting right for all Board members. Every decision 
requires a majority of the votes. In addition, however, 
it is also required that the votes in favour represent a 
majority of the population of the euro area. An alterna-
tive would be to require that these votes represent a 
majority of the euro area’s GDP. A problem with all the 
vote-based reform scenarios is, however, that they do 
not necessarily address the problem of decision-mak-
ing costs. Decision-making costs in the narrow sense 
of voting on, say, interest-rate changes, need not be 
particularly problematic. However, the Council’s deci-
sion-making process will involve more than the simple 
aggregation of votes but also, for example, a more or 
less extensive discussion of the views of all members. 
In this case, weighting votes does not necessarily 
solve the ECB’s “large number problem”. Finally, simi-
lar to the argument made regarding the centralisation 
solution, it should be noted that a weighted voting 
scheme might be viewed as interfering too much with 
the “one person, one vote” principle embedded in the 
ECB Statute, although this may apply somewhat less 
to the “double majority” system. 
An alternative reform scenario, representation, 
combines some of the characteristics of the centrali-
sation and the weighing approach. The principal idea 
would be to create groups of euro member countries 
with joint representation and joint voting rights in the 
ECB Council, integrating the concept of a strong re-
gional anchor with the necessity of restricting the size 
of the ECB’s main decision-making body after the 
enlargement. The representation scenario requires a 
number of specifi c institutional decisions, in particu-
lar on group selection. The selection principle could 
be based on the idea of common economic regions 
(taking into account similarities in business cycles or 
economic structure), economic size, or both. Related 
issues are the number of groups, the overall Council 
size, and the delegation of voting power from group 
members to their representative in the ECB Govern-
ing Council. The alternative institutional designs range 
from a restricted or “imperative” mandate (votes in 
the Council are pre-determined at the group level) to 
an unrestricted mandate (group members delegate 
their full voting rights to their representatives). How-
ever, since the latter arrangement could, in principle, 
deprive individual group members of their right to 
participate in the decision-making, there is a potential 
confl ict with the idea of national representation and 
the “one person, one vote” principle. This makes a 
solution entailing some form of explicit involvement 
of national central banks at the group level before 
a Council decision, i.e. a restricted mandate for the 
group representatives in the Council, a likely part of 
any representation scenario. Such a restriction is likely 
to encompass contributions to Council discussions as 
well as formal voting. In this sense, it will alleviate the 
decision-making costs problem at the level of the ECB 
Governing Council. However, these costs will substan-
tially increase at the level of the group. If the mandate 
of group representatives in the Council is restricted, in 
the sense that their actions require the explicit consent 
of group members, the overall time and effort needed 
for a Council decision will be of a similar magnitude, if 
not higher, as in the previously discussed scenario. 
A variant of the representation idea is the extension 
of central bank jurisdictions across national borders. 
9 P. B o f i n g e r : Consequences of the Modifi cation of the Governing 
Council Rules, Briefi ng Paper for the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, February 2003.
10 H. B e rg e r, J. De H a a n , R. I n k l a a r, op. cit.
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For instance, the regional central banks in the Federal 
Reserve System extend the borders of the States of 
the Union, and some of the (post-1992) Landeszen-
tralbanken in the Bundesbank Council represent 
more than one German state. An application of this 
principle to the ECB after enlargement could help to 
reduce the number of decision-makers in the Council. 
If the design of central bank areas aimed at establish-
ing regional banks of approximately similar economic 
weight, it would also contribute signifi cantly to avoid-
ing mismatches between voting power and economic 
size. However, as with the previous scenarios, there 
could be issues regarding the political feasibility of 
a reform that included abolishing the existing voting 
rights of current euro area member states. Further-
more, it would imply that one of the basic principles of 
the current ECB set-up, i.e. “representation” of coun-
tries, would be surrendered. 
An alternative reform scenario that, in principle, 
might also be able to address both the mismatch 
between political and economic weights and the deci-
sion-making problem associated with the enlargement 
of euro area membership (while avoiding some of the 
political constraints discussed above) could be (asym-
metric) rotation. The basic idea is that national central 
bank governors would take turns sitting in the Coun-
cil, with the frequency of their participation scaled to 
match the relative economic weight of their respective 
country. Rotation would thus work to weight the votes 
of national central bank governors in an implicit fash-
ion. Arguably, therefore, rotation would pose less of a 
confl ict with the “one person, one vote” principle than 
centralisation, weighted voting, or the representation 
scenario. While not all governors would participate in 
every Council meeting, those who participated would 
cast a full vote. Rotation could also serve to limit the 
overall size of the ECB Council by allowing only a 
fraction of central bank governors to participate in 
meetings. The ability to address the potential prob-
lems posed by enlargement while avoiding part of the 
political feasibility problems associated with some of 
the other reform ideas make rotation schemes a likely 
candidate for ECB reform. Berger et al.11 discuss a 
number of more specifi c options for such an ECB 
reform scenario, constructing groups on the basis of 
three criteria:
• size, i.e. maximise the average share of euro area 
GDP represented
• infl ation, i.e. minimise the average within-group 
standard deviation of infl ation
• correlation of business cycles with other members in 
the group, i.e. maximise the within-group business 
cycle correlation.
These authors conclude that only groups based 
on the size criterion guarantee that more than 50 
per cent of the euro area’s GDP would constantly be 
represented in the Council. This implies, however, that 
the principle of equal voting rights has perhaps to be 
abandoned. The easiest way to ensure that more than 
half of the euro area’s GDP is always represented is to 
give the “big fi ve” a permanent seat in the Governing 
Council. If this turns out to be politically unacceptable, 
a system may be considered in which the big fi ve also 
rotate, but substantially less often than the other coun-
tries. Berger et al.12 present the example of 4 seats for 
the big fi ve, who rotate, and 5 seats for all the others, 
who also rotate. 
The ECB Reform Proposal 
In its meeting of 19 December 2002, the Governing 
Council of the ECB adopted a proposal for reform of 
the ECB after enlargement of the monetary union. As 
in the analysis by Berger et al.,13 the ECB proposal puts 
a limit on the number of central bank governors exer-
cising a voting right. However, the ECB puts this maxi-
mum at 15, instead of 9. Consequently, the Governing 
Council will consist of 21 members, which is much too 
large from a decision-making cost perspective. No 
modern central bank has a decisionmaking body this 
size. Moreover, all members of the Governing Council 
(with and without voting rights) will continue to sit at 
the table and have the right to participate in the dis-
cussion. As Bofi nger14 puts it, “in spite of its complex-
ity the Recommendation clearly fails to meet the main 
target of the ECB’s institutional reform. The danger 
that the Council would be paralysed by too many par-
ticipants is still there.” The ECB proposes that, if the 
euro area increases to more than 15 countries, there 
will be two groups with rotating voting rights. The fi rst 
group will consist of the governors of the member 
states that occupy the highest positions in the coun-
try rankings on the basis of a composite indicator of 
“representativeness”. They share four voting rights. 
The second group will consist of all other governors, 








nent of the “representativeness” indicator will be the 
member state’s GDP. The second component will be 
the total assets of the aggregated balance sheet of 
monetary fi nancial institutions (TABS-MFI) within the 
territory of the member state concerned. The relative 
weights of the two components are 5/6 for GDP and 
1/6 for TABS-MFI. Once there are 22 euro area mem-
ber states, there will be three groups with rotation. The 
allocation of central banks to the groups will be based 
on a ranking according to the composite indicator. The 
rotation scheme as proposed by the ECB is as follows. 
The fi rst group, which will have four votes, will be 
composed of the fi ve central bank governors from the 
euro area member states which occupy the highest 
positions (the “big fi ve”). The second group, with eight 
voting rights, will consist of half of all national central 
bank governors selected from the subsequent posi-
tions in the ranking. The third group will be composed 
of the remaining governors. They will share three vot-
ing rights. Thus, if there are 27 members, the intertem-
poral voting power of a national governor would be 80 
per cent in the fi rst group, 57 per cent in the second 
and 38 per cent in the third.15 
The ECB proposal has met considerable criticism 
from academic observers. Gros16 argues, for instance, 
that “the solution proposed by the ECB is worse than 
the status quo. It is ineffi cient, opaque, internally in-
consistent and arbitrary.” Apart from critique on the 
size of the Governing Council that we share, Gros has 
the following objections to the ECB proposal. 
• First, it “gives up the principle of equality of member 
states, thus potentially undermining the idea that all 
members of Governing Council should forget the 
particular interests of their home country and act on-
ly in the interest of the entire euro area.” As we have 
argued before, the best way to ensure that national 
interests will not unduly infl uence ECB policy-mak-
ing is to bring political power and economic weight 
of national central bank governors as closely into line 
as possible. Even if national central bank governors 
take economic developments in their home country 
into account, this will not lead to decisions that will 
be out of line with the ECB’s mandate for price sta-
bility in the euro area as a whole. Some preliminary 
calculations under the assumption of an EMU with 
27 members by Berger et al.17 suggest that the aver-
age share of GDP represented is quite high under 
the reform as proposed by the ECB: 73 per cent. So, 
reform along these lines is certainly helpful to over-
come the most important institutional design failure 
of the ECB. 
• Second, the proposal lacks clarity. For example, it is 
not clear how the fi rst group of 5 countries will share 
four votes. Will they rotate every meeting, every 
month, every year? In what order? What happens 
to new members of the euro area? It is clear that 
the ECB proposal has to be further specifi ed, but it 
seems that these practical matters are not a princi-
ple objection towards the proposal as such. 
• Third, Gros argues that the proposal is internally 
inconsistent, because “the aim is to ensure better 
representation of the larger countries. But this will 
not be achieved if the rotation principle is applied 
immediately once euro area membership reaches 
15.” In our view, this critique does not make much 
sense. In the longer term, the proposal implies that 
bigger countries will have a larger say in monetary 
policy-making. 
• Fourth, Gros argues that the ECB proposal is not 
transparent because it is too complicated. Further-
more, it has arbitrary elements: the weight given to 
the indicator of the size of fi nancial markets (one 
sixth) is not motivated in any way and seems de-
signed to ensure a better position for one country 
(Luxembourg). According to Gros, Luxembourg will 
have a larger weight than Finland (a country with 
about 10 times the population and 6 times the GDP 
of Luxembourg). The third group with the lowest 
voting power would consist exclusively of the new 
members. 
We agree that the criteria for determining the voting 
groups is rather arbitrary. As pointed out before, we 
prefer grouping on the basis of economic size (GDP) 
only. Furthermore, there should be a clear rule on how 
often the grouping can be reconsidered to take into 
account that the relative size of countries may change 
over time. If the new member countries grow faster 
than the current euro area countries, they must get a 
higher voting share. There is evidence suggesting that 
voting in the Bundesbank decision-making body was 
actually infl uenced by regional economic considera-
tions.18 The best way to mitigate any political infl uence 
that could be at odds with the aim of price stability 
in the euro area as a whole is to align political and 
15 Ibid.
16 D. G ro s , op. cit.
17 H. B e rg e r, J. De H a a n , R. I n k l a a r, op. cit.
18 H. B e rg e r, J. De H a a n : Are Small Countries too Powerful Within 




economic weights as closely as possible. If national 
politicians put pressure on their central bank, based 
on the economic situation of the country concerned, 
and central bankers act upon it, this would not lead to 
distorted decision-making. 
Change at the ECB Executive Board 
In its meeting of 2 March 2006, the Governing 
Council of the ECB adopted an opinion on a recom-
mendation from the Council of the European Union on 
the appointment of a new member of the Executive 
Board of the ECB.19 This ECB opinion means that the 
Governing Council has no objections to the proposed 
candidate, Dr. Jürgen Stark, who is a person of recog-
nised standing and professional experience in mon-
etary or banking matters, as required by Article 112 (2) 
(b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
Following this ECB opinion and a similar opinion ex-
pressed by the European Parliament, the new member 
of the Executive Board will be appointed by common 
accord of the governments of the member states, 
which have adopted the single currency at the level 
of Heads of State or Government. The ministers of fi -
nance of the European Union have already expressed 
their support for Dr. Stark. In view of the upcoming 
hearing in April at the European Parliament with the 
nominee replacing Prof. Otmar Issing as a member 
of the ECB’s Executive Board, the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs has asked, amongst 
others, the following three questions. 
• What is your assessment of the current distribution 
of responsibilities within the ECB Board and its inter-
nal political equilibrium? 
• Do you think there will be a major redistribution of 
portfolios once Mr. Issing is gone? 
• What is your general view on the way these hearings 
are conducted, and the fact that Parliament lacks a 
real say in the nominations contrary to what happens 
in the United States? 
In order to address these interrelated questions, I 
will fi rst discuss the current distribution of responsibili-
ties within the Executive Board and its internal political 
equilibrium. Table 1 gives an overview of the various 
business areas and the present reporting lines to the 
members of the Executive Board. The Executive Board 
of the ECB is a collegial body and has a collective re-
sponsibility for all business areas. This means that all 
decisions are taken jointly by the Executive Board and 
not by individual members of the Board. The distribu-
tion of particular responsibilities for various business 
areas is determined by the Executive Board itself; this 
can change and, indeed, has changed in the past. It is 
for reasons of functionality that business areas report 
to the Executive Board through one of its members. 
As shown in Table 1, President Trichet is responsible 
for communications and internal audit, while the re-
sponsibility of Vice-president Papademos is fi nancial 
stability and supervision, as well as human resources, 
budget and organisation. Chief Economist Issing is 
responsible for both the DGs economics and research; 
these departments are directly involved in the prepa-
ration and formulation of all decisions on monetary 
policy. Mr. González-Páramo is responsible for infor-
mation systems, statistics and banknotes, while Mrs. 
Tumpel-Gugerell oversees market operations, pay-
ments systems and market infrastructure. Finally, the 
19 Cf. European Central Bank: Press Release on “ECB opinion on the 
appointment of a new member of the Executive Board of the ECB”, 
Frankfurt-am-Main, 2 March 2006.
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most recently appointed Executive Board member, Dr. 
Bini Smaghi is responsible for international and Euro-
pean relations, including the ECB’s permanent repre-
sentation in Washington DC. The key issue is whether 
the current distribution of responsibilities constitutes a 
stable, internal political equilibrium and, in view of this, 
whether there will be (or, perhaps, should be) a major 
redistribution of portfolios once Mr. Issing is gone. 
For a stable, internal political equilibrium within the 
ECB’s Executive Board it is desirable that the responsi-
bilities for the DG Economics and the DG Research are 
not concentrated within the portfolio of a single Exec-
utive Board member. Since these two departments are 
directly involved in preparing and formulating all deci-
sions on monetary policy (the central task of the ECB), 
it would be desirable for the functioning of a proper 
system of checks and balances within the Board that 
the responsibilities for the two departments are redis-
tributed over two different Executive Board members. 
As President Trichet chairs both the Executive Board 
and the Governing Council of the ECB, it would also 
be desirable to have these two departments not under 
his direct supervision in order to preserve his role as 
independent chairman. The DG Economics could, 
for example, report to Vice-President Papademos, 
because of his extensive experience in this fi eld, and 
the DG Research could e.g. report to Mr. Bini Smaghi. 
The advantage of separating the reporting lines of the 
DG Economics and the DG Research could be that 
key aspects of the debate on monetary policy deci-
sion-making would move to the level of the Executive 
Board as a collegial body instead of taking place and 
being resolved within the portfolio of a single member 
of the Board. The responsibility for international and 
European relations could then be handed over from 
Mr. Bini Smaghi to Mr. Stark, who has both as State 
Secretary in Bundesfi nanzministerium (Germany’s 
Federal Financial Ministry) and as Vice-president of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank ample and wide experi-
ence in international and European relations. 
Finally, I shall give my view on the way these 
hearings for the appointment of an Executive Board 
member are conducted, and the fact that the Euro-
pean Parliament lacks a real say in the nominations 
contrary to what happens in the United States. Unfor-
tunately, the European Parliament does not have the 
same position as the US Congress with respect to the 
nominations for the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. This difference in positions can be 
explained by the fact that the Federal Reserve System 
is a creature of the US Congress.20 For the European 
Parliament to have a real say in the nominations for the 
ECB’s Executive Board would require a change in the 
Statute of the ECB, which seems quite unlikely. This 
does not mean, however, that the ECB could not con-
sult the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
ex ante on future Executive Board nominations on its 
own initiative. 
Some Conclusions 
It is clear that the ECB has to be reformed in view 
of the future enlargement of the euro area. Under the 
current set-up, the Governing Council will become 
an excessively large body. From the decision-mak-
ing cost perspective, a larger role for the Executive 
Board would be an attractive option for reform. If the 
Board were also to become responsible for monetary 
policy-making, the risks of a distorted monetary policy 
would also be minimal, provided that the Board had a 
truly euro-area-wide focus. If, however, the Governing 
Council remains the decision-making body, a reform 
that brought the political power and economic weight 
of national central bank governors as closely in line 
as possible would be preferable. From this perspec-
tive, the reform proposal of the ECB points in the 
right direction. The reform foresees a rotation system 
in which the likelihood that a national central bank 
governor will have a voting right depends on the size 
of the economy of his home country. However, a seri-
ous problem in this proposal is the size of the Council 
(15 national central bank governors with voting rights 
and 6 Executive Board members) and the fact that na-
tional central bank governors without voting rights can 
also participate in the discussion. A smaller Governing 
Council – with, for instance, 15 members – in which 
only national central bank governors with a voting right 
can participate would probably lead to more effi cient 
decision-making than the proposal of the ECB. For the 
European Parliament to have a real say in the nomina-
tions for the ECB’s Executive Board would require a 
change in the Statute of the ECB, which seems quite 
unlikely. This does not mean that the ECB could not 
consult the Committee on Economic and Monetary Af-
fairs ex ante on future Executive Board nominations on 
its own initiative. 
20 Cf. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Federal 
Reserve Act And Other Statutory Provisions Affecting the Federal Re-
serve System, Washington DC, August 1990. Section 10.1 (1-077) of 
the Federal Reserve Act reads as follows: “The Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”) 
shall be composed of seven members, to be appointed by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, ..., for terms 
of fourteen years except as hereinafter provided, ...” 
